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ABSTRACT:  Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along two distinct 
lines—transfers within the family and transfers beyond the family—without considering the fact 
that the two types of transfers are actually interrelated. Using longitudinal data from the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS), this article investigates the links between the time and financial 
transfers within and beyond the family.  The concepts of within and beyond the family transfers 
are discussed. Several data quality problems with the transfer measures in the HRS are corrected. 
Focusing on the interrelationships among the four types of transfers, the study finds that the 
transfers within and beyond the family are complements in the sense that households that are 
more willing to make within-family transfers are also more willing to make beyond-family 
transfers, and vice versa. Income and wealth are strong predictors of financial transfers. Black 
and Hispanic households lag systematically in the generosity to help the people both within and 
beyond their families.  
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  1I. Introduction 
Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along two distinct lines. In 
one line, economists and sociologists focus on transfers within the family, arguing that such  
transfers are the result of altruistic preference for family members (Becker, 1974, 1991; Becker 
& Tomes, 1986; Loury, 1981), or of mutual perceived advantage in transacting, or engaging in 
joint production by the family members (Pollak, 1985; Williamson, 1979). In the other line, 
writers on philanthropy and nonprofit work concentrate on the time and financial transfers 
beyond the family, studying such phenomena as charitable donations and volunteer work 
(Andreoni, Gale, & Scholz, 1995; Bekkers, 2001; Callen, 1994; Carlin, 2001; Jones & Posnett, 
1991; Kitchen & Dalton, 1990). With a few exceptions (e.g., Mulligan, 1997; Schervish & 
Havens, 2003), the two lines of research have seldom intersected, leaving researchers on the 
transfers within the family taking as exogenous the time and financial transfers beyond the 
family, and researchers on philanthropy and nonprofit work treating charitable donations and 
volunteer work as isolated decisions unrelated to the within-family transfers. 
Time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are clearly interrelated, 
however, for several obvious reasons. First, the two types of financial transfers and a family’s 
own consumption add up, determined by the total financial resources available to each family. 
Other things being equal, more within-family financial transfers imply fewer resources available 
for decisions related to charitable donations. More charitable donations would shift the budget 
line inward when making decisions regarding financial transfers to children or parents. Second, 
the total amount of time available to each individual (and hence, to each family) is fixed. When a 
family has more obligations to spend time caring for their children or parents, less time is 
  2available to do volunteer work, and vice versa. In short, the within-family transfer and the 
beyond-family transfer seem to be substitutes. 
Families do not have the same propensities to give, of course, due to either differential 
preferences or heterogeneity or both. Research shows, for example, that parents differ in their 
valuation of child well-being (Nordblom & Ohlsson, 2003), that people with higher income and 
level of education are more likely to volunteer (Current Population Survey, 2002), that adults 
who were involved in giving and volunteerism in their youth tend to maintain that involvement 
in their adulthood (Independent Sector, 2001), and that those who belong to religious 
organizations are more likely to volunteer and make charitable donations (Independent Sector, 
2001). Thus, if differential propensities to give exist across the destinations (family and 
philanthropic organization) of transfers, those who are more willing to give within the family 
may also have high propensities to give beyond the family, suggesting that transfers within and 
beyond the family may also act as complements. The exact relationship between the within-
family transfer and the beyond-family transfer is therefore likely to be determined by the two 
competing—substitution versus complementary—effects. 
Understanding the empirical interrelationship between the within-family and the beyond-
family transfers has both important theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, by 
bringing together these transfers, researchers can help lay ground for any future effort to unite 
them in an integrated theoretical model. If the transfers are indeed strongly correlated, for 
example, conventional studies on intergenerational transfer or more generally on family 
behavior, which take as exogenous any transfers beyond family, need to be expanded.   
Practically, empirical evidence on the relationship between the transfers, which is currently 
  3scarce in the literature, may help the nonprofit sector better understand the mechanism of 
individual giving and identify viable and reliable sources to increase the sector’s substainability.  
In this article I attempt to link the time and financial transfers within the family to those 
beyond the family. Specifically, I use panel data from the Health and Retirement Study 1992–
2000 to examine the potential correlations among all the four types of transfers. The following 
fundamental issues will be examined: (a) to what extent do the financial transfers within the 
family influence the financial and time transfers beyond the family (i.e., charitable donations and 
volunteer work); (b) to what extent do time transfers within the family influence the financial 
and time transfers beyond the family; (c) to what extent do charitable donations influence the 
financial and time transfers within the family; and (d) to what extent does volunteer work 
influence the financial and time transfers within the family. Do the transfers within the family 
and beyond the family behave as substitutes or complements? How do time transfers influence 
financial transfers—and vice versa in a model that integrates all the four types of transfers? Do 
the factors influencing the transfers within the family or beyond the family play the same or 
similar roles in the model? 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II examines the time and financial 
transfer measures in the HRS. Several data quality problems are discussed and an overall picture 
of the four types of transfers is provided. In Section III, I first define two levels of “cross-
transfer” effects (the impact of one type of transfer on another), and then estimate the cross-
effects in various regression models. Among the results from these models, which are 
summarized in Section IV, are evidence of complementarities between the transfers within and 
beyond the family; strong household income and asset effects on the financial transfers; and 
  4evidence that minority populations lag systematically in their generosity in helping the people 
both within and beyond the family.  
 
II. Measuring the Time and Financial Transfers in the HRS 
 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), conducted biennially since 1992, is a national 
longitudinal survey of older (50+ years) Americans. Developed to “provide data for researchers, 
policy analysts, and program planners who are making major policy decisions that affect 
retirement, health insurance, saving and economic well-being” (HRS, 1999), the study contains 
rich information on the income and time transfers—including within-family time and financial 
transfers—that may affect individuals’ retirement expectations, attitudes, and opportunities. It 
also contains rich information on individual characteristics that have been found to be significant 
in influencing a family’s decisions on time and financial transfers. 
The within-family time transfer in the HRS is measured as an aggregate of three major 
components: the hours spent caring for grandchildren; the hours spent helping parents eat, dress, 
and bathe; and the hours spent helping parents with household chores, errands, and 
transportation. These components, however, were not measured consistently across waves. In 
HRS 1992 and 1994, the time frame for measuring such transfers was “the past 12 months.” 
Since HRS 1996, however, the time frame has been changed to “since the last interview” or “in 
the past 2 years.” In order to achieve cross-wave comparability, I converted the measures in HRS 
1996-2000
1 into ones related only to “the past 12 months.” The total time transfer within the 
                                                 
1 For those interviewed in both the HRS 1994 and 1996, the actual interview months were used in making this 
conversion for the comparable measures in the HRS 1996. For those who were first interviewed in HRS 1996 or 
after, I assumed that the original HRS 1996 measures were about “the last 2 years” or 24 months. Conversions for 
the HRS 1998 or 2000 measures were done in the similar way. 
 
  5family was thus defined as sum of the hours spent caring for grandchildren and caring for parents 
in the past 12 months. 
The “2 years to 12 months conversion” procedure runs as follows. Let X be the time 
transfer measure reported for the past 2 years or since the last interview. Let the number of the 
months between the current and last interviews be n. The new, time-frame-adjusted transfer 
measure, y, would then be calculated as (12X/n), based on a simple linear relationship between 
the quantity of the transfer and the reference period.
2
The within-family financial transfer has two components: financial assistance given to 
parents and financial assistance given to children.
3 Like the within-family time transfer, these 
components were measured inconsistently across waves. They were similarly transformed to 
yield 12 month measures. The total financial transfer within the family was thus defined as total 
financial assistance given to parents and children in the past 12 months. 
The information about the transfers beyond the family in the HRS is not as rich as the 
information about the transfers within the family. For the financial transfer, each household was 
first asked whether it had made at least $500 charitable donations in the past year, and—if the 
answer was yes—then how much the donations had been. For the time transfer, the most relevant 
measure was the hours of volunteer work done in the past 12 months for religious, educational, 
health-related, or other charitable organizations. 
4  
 
                                                 
2 According to Hill (1999), however, this strategy may introduce bias to the adjusted measure because people recall 
events over a more recent time period better than for a more distant time period. To concentrate on the task at hand, 
I will not explore this issue in this article. 
  
3 The within-family financial transfer does not include financial assistance to grandchildren as the information is not 
available in all the HRS waves studied. 
 
4 The HRS also had an experimental module on volunteer work in 1996. I excluded the information from the 
analysis because it was not for the entire HRS sample or for other years. 
 
  6Data Truncation and Cross-Wave Inconsistency 
In addition to the different time frames used for measuring the time and financial 
transfers within the family mentioned above, the transfer measures in the HRS suffer from two 
other types of data limitations. First, in most cases, the information on the transfer variables was 
truncated, in the sense that it was available only when a certain threshold was exceeded. If a 
specific threshold was not met, the relevant transfer measure had to be set to zero. This type of 
data limitation leads to the mean value of the measure being downward biased.
5 Second, when a 
truncation rule was imposed, the truncation point was not always the same across waves. The 
information on the hours helping grandchildren, for example, was available if a respondent had 
helped his or her grandchildren more than 50 hours in the past 12 months in HRS 1994, whereas 
the same information was available only if a respondent had helped his or her grandchildren 
more than 100 hours in the past 12 months in HRS 1992. This type of data limitation produces 
inconsistent transfer measures. 
Although the combined impact of the two types of data limitations is unknown, it is the 
second type of data limitation that is likely to cause more serious problems in the analysis of the 
transfer data. Consequently, I will ignore here the truncation bias due to the first type of data 
limitation and concentrate on the inconsistencies caused by using different truncation values 
across waves. 
  Table 1, rows A and B, document the time frames and truncation values used for 
measuring all the four types of transfer variables in HRS 1992–2000. Except for the financial 
transfer beyond the family, which was measured for the past 12 months and truncated at $500 for 
all waves, all other types of transfers had cross-wave inconsistencies. The aggregate measure of 
                                                 
5 Consider a positive transfer measure, Y, that is left-truncated at threshold α.  E(Y) = Pr(Y ≤ α)*E(Y│Y ≤ α) + Pr(Y 
> α) * E(Y│> α) ≥ Pr(Y ≤ α) * 0 + Pr(Y > α) * E(Y│> α).  
  7the within-family time transfer in HRS 1992 tended to be downward biased considering that the 
truncation values in all the other waves were lower. By the same token, the within-family 
financial transfer tended to be downward biased in HRS 1992 but upward biased in HRS 1994, 
relative to the standards used in HRS 1996-2000. In addition, the time transfers beyond the 
family in both HRS 1992 and 1994 were also downward biased.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Table 2, row A, summarizes the four types of transfers in the past 12 months in HRS 
1992–2000 before corrections. Several points need to be made about these data. First, as 
expected, the mean values of the time transfer beyond the family was significantly downward 
biased in both HRS 1992 and 1994, relative to the numbers in the other HRS waves. With no 
truncation on the measure in HRS 1996-2000, 40% of households reported to have done some 
volunteer work in the past 12 months. When the measure was truncated at 100 hours, as in HRS 
1992 and 1994, the percentage was reduced to about 20, suggesting that only half of the 
volunteering households had done volunteer work 100 hours or more. Second, the mean value of 
the time transfer within the family in HRS 1992 seemed also to be downward biased. Third, the 
financial transfer beyond the family, the only type of transfer measured in the same way across 
waves, seemed to show a very consistent time-series pattern, with the mean value of the transfer 
steadily increasing from $823 in HRS 1992 to $1,298 in HRS 2000.  
 




  8Correcting for Cross-Wave Consistency 
  There are two alternative ways to correct the cross-wave inconsistencies in the transfer 
measures in the HRS. First, with the help of certain distributional assumptions of each transfer 
variable, one can get corrected mean values of the entire sample with no data truncation. 
Although the prospect of getting unconditional mean values for all the transfer variables is 
tempting, the validity of this approach critically hinges on the validity of the distributional 
assumptions. Second, one may get a consistent measure of each transfer variable across waves by 
setting a new, uniform truncation point for the variable in all the waves. Obviously, this approach 
does not require any distributional assumptions about the transfers. But because a new truncation 
point has to be as great as the greatest of all the original truncation points, some of the transfer 
information has to be thrown away.  
In this article, I use the second approach to correct the inconsistencies in the transfer 
variables. Specifically, I use the truncation values in HRS 1992 as the base, determining the new 
truncation points in other waves according to the time frames used. For the within-family 
financial transfer, for example, the new truncation point is $500 in HRS 1994, when the time 
frame was “in the past 12 months,” and $1,000 in HRS 1996-2000, when the time frame was “in 
the last 2 years” or “since the last interview.” Similarly, for the within-family time transfer, it is 
100 hours in HRS 1994, and 200 hours in HRS 1996-2000. Because the financial transfer beyond 
the family has already been measured with the same truncation point in all the waves, no 
correction is needed for this type of transfer. The new, adjusted truncation values for each of the 
transfers are given in Table 1, row C. 
  Table 2, row B, summarizes the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family 
in the past 12 months in HRS 1992–2000 after corrections. Compared to the results before 
  9corrections in row A, all the measures affected by the correction go in the expected direction: 
their mean values go down when the truncation values in HRS 1992 are used as the base. The 
time series patterns of the transfers—if any—are stronger and more consistent. Both the time and 
financial transfers within the family were declining steadily. In HRS 1992, 30% of the 
households provided more than 100 hours of family care, whereas 40% of the households 
provided more than $500 financial assistance to their family members. These numbers were 31% 
and 32%, respectively, in HRS 2000. Over the same period, average family care hours dropped 
by about 34%, from 310 hours in HRS 1992, to 226 hours in HRS 2000, whereas the average 
amount of financial assistance dropped by one third, from $2,231 in HRS 1992 to $1,496 in HRS 
2000.  
  By contrast, both types of transfers beyond the family showed a nontrivial trend of 
increase. The financial transfer in particular exhibited a very strong increasing pattern over the 
HRS 1992–2000 period: The percentage of the households donating at least $500 to charities 
increased from 40 in HRS 1992 to 45 in HRS 2000, whereas the average donations increased by 
57%, from $823 to $1,289. On the other hand, the percentage of households who had done more 
than 100 hours of volunteer work was 18 in HRS 1992, and 20 in HRS 2000. Over the same 
period, the average hours of volunteer work increased by about 35%, from 58 to 78.  
One immediate consequence of the diverging within and beyond the family transfer 
patterns is that the total time transfer, which combines the time transfers within and beyond the 
family, and the total financial transfer, which combines the financial transfers within and beyond 
the family, show less salient time series patterns (see Table 2, rows C and D). From HRS 1992 to 
2000, though the percentage of households who had made at least 100 hours of time transfer 
either within or beyond the family increased by about 3%, the mean value of the transfer 
  10decreased by about 28%. Similarly, while the percentage of households who had made at least 
$500 of financial transfer either within or beyond the family remained practically the same, the 
mean value of the transfer decreased by about 8%. These results seem to lead to the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are 
substitutes. More time transfer within the family leads to less time transfer beyond 
the family, and vice versa. Greater financial transfer within the family leads to 
fewer financial transfer beyond the family, and vice versa. 
 
Hypothesis 2. As people approach their retirement, time and financial transfers 




III. Cross-Effects in Regression Models 
 
  In order to test the validity of the above hypotheses, and more generally, to understand 
the mechanism of the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family, I estimated a set 
of simple regression models. Included in each transfer model were demographic variables (e.g., 
age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment), variables representing a household’s economic 
and labor market status, and variables representing the family structure. To capture the effects of 
other transfers on the transfer as the dependent variable (or “cross-transfer effects” for short), all 
three other transfers were also included in the model. 
Two levels of cross-transfer effects were defined. In the first level, the cross-transfer 
effect refers to the impact of one type of transfer on another type across the form of transfer 
(time or money) or across the “destination” of the transfer (within or beyond the family), but not 
both. Examples of this include the effect of the within-family time transfer on the within-family 
financial transfer, the effect of the within-family time transfer on the beyond-family time 
  11transfer, and the effect of the beyond-family financial transfer on the beyond-family time 
transfer. In the second level, the cross-transfer effect refers to the impact of one type of transfer 
on another type across both the form and the “destination” of transfer. Examples of this include 
the effect of the within-family time transfer on the beyond-family financial transfer, and the 
effect of the beyond-family time transfer on the within-family financial transfer. Empirical 
evidence on the signs or the magnitude of these cross-effects is scarce. Presumably, strong and 
positive cross-effects would suggest that the time and financial transfers within and beyond the 
family are complements, whereas strong and negative cross-effects imply that the transfers are 
substitutes.  
That a household’s economic and labor market status affects its transfer behavior has 
been well documented in the literature (Andreoni et al., 1995; Becker, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 
1986; Brooks, 2004; Dettingger & Clarkberg, 2002; Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987). Wealthier 
parents, for example, are not only more capable of transferring their assets to their children—in 
the forms of both human capital investment and bequest—but also more capable of making 
charitable donations. Compared to those who are not very active in the labor market, individuals 
who have full-time jobs may have less time caring for their family members or doing volunteer 
work.  
The variables reflecting a household economic and labor market status in the transfer 
models included total household assets at the time of the interview, total household income in the 
last calendar year, and a dummy variable indicating whether any of the household income was 
labor income. In accordance with the HRS income and asset definitions (HRS, 2002), total 
household assets comprise housing equities, real estate, business or farm, individual retirement 
accounts, stocks or mutual funds, certificates of deposit, bonds, checking or savings accounts, 
  12transportation vehicles, and other nonliquid assets, minus debts. Total household income was 
calculated as the sum of labor income, income from assets, and income from any other sources 
defined by the HRS. Labor income included wages or salary, bonuses, tips or commissions, 
income from professional practice or trade, and income from a second job or self-employment.  
The definitions and a summary of all the independent variables in the models are given in 
Table 3.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
 
Single Wave Results 
Tables 4a–4d list the Tobit regression results for the models estimated separately for each 
of the HRS data waves from 1992 to 2000. Tobit models were chosen for two reasons. First, all 
transfer measures as the dependent variables were truncated. Second, because the truncation 
points were set mechanically, there are no obvious reasons to believe Tobit models would 
produce biased estimates.  
A strong education effect is shown in all the four transfer models and across all the HRS 
waves. In general, a household with more education tends to spend less time on family care but 
provides more financial assistance to the family members. In addition, a household with more 
education tends to do more volunteer work and make more charitable donations. Age plays a 
statistically significant role only in determining the financial transfers. Older people tend to 
provide less financial assistance to their parents and their children but make more charitable 
donations.   
(Tables 4a-4d about here) 
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picture clearly suggests that Hispanic households tend to spend less time on family care and 
volunteer work, Black and Hispanic households tend to provide less financial assistance to the 
family members, and White non-Hispanic households tend to make more charitable donations. 
  The asset and income effects are strong in the models predicting the financial transfers, 
but trivial in the models predicting the time transfers. In general, rich or high-income households 
tend to make more financial transfers both within and beyond the family. Conditional on income, 
households with no labor income tend to make more financial transfers. 
 
Cross-Effects 
  The correlations between one type of transfer on the other for the same transfer form or 
for the same transfer destination are strong, as indicated in Table 5, which summarizes all the 12 
possible cross-effects based on the single wave regression results in Tables 4a–4d. All 8 Level-1 
cross-effects are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Hypothesis 1 induced from 
Table 2 is probably not valid. On the other hand, all the four Level-2 cross effects are zero, 
indicating that there is a boundary for one type of transfer to impact another type of transfer. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
 
  Another interesting result from Table 5 is that the cross-effects are symmetric, suggesting 
that a household probably makes a joint decision on the transfers within the family and beyond 
the family, and makes a joint decision on the time transfer and the financial transfer. 
 
  14Models with Pooled Data
6
  Regression results are not very different if the models are estimated with the HRS 1992–
2000 data pooled together (Tables 6 and 7). Several important points need to be emphasized, 
however.  
 
(Tables 6 and 7 about here) 
 
 
First, the race/ethnicity effect becomes more evident than that in the single wave data 
models: Other things being equal, Black and Hispanic households tend to spend less time on 
family care, do less volunteer work, provide less financial assistance to the family members, and 
make less charitable donations. 
Second, the income and asset effects are stronger in the models predicting financial 
transfers than in the models predicting time transfers. Rich households tend to provide more 
financial assistance to their family members and make more charitable donations. Conditional on 
income, households with no labor income—thus not actively engaged in the labor market— tend 
to do more volunteer work. 
Third, two Level-2 cross-effects emerge from the pooled models: the more the beyond- 
family time transfer, the more the within-family financial transfer, and vice versa. One possible 
explanation for this effect is that people who spend a lot of time away from the family may try to 
compensate family members by providing them with more money, whereas people who have 
more family care obligations may try to fulfill their volunteering work by making more monetary 
donations.
7
                                                 
6 I have also estimated a set of “fixed effect” models using the pooled data but found no significant differences in the 
cross-effect variables. 
7 I owe an anonymous referee for this explanation. 
  15Fourth, age becomes a statistically significant factor in all the transfer models. Overall, 
the time and financial transfers within the family tend to decrease over time, whereas the 
transfers beyond the family increase over the time. This finding suggests that Hypothesis 2 





The empirical results from the HRS clearly indicate that the time and financial transfers 
within and beyond the family are closely related. The consistently positive and symmetric Level-
1 cross-effects suggest that the transfers within and beyond the family are not substitutes but 
complements, in the sense that households that are more willing to make within-family transfers 
are also more willing to make beyond-family transfers, and vice versa. In addition, within the 
same transfer destinations, households that are more willing to make time transfers are also more 
willing to make financial transfers.  
Education plays a significant role in influencing a family’s transfer decision. In general, a 
household with more education tends to spend less time on family care, but do more volunteer 
work, provide more financial assistance to family members, and make more charitable donations. 
There are several possible explanations for the strong education effect on the time transfers 
within and beyond the family. First, well-educated households are perhaps more efficient 
household producers, so they have more time for outside activities. Second, well-educated 
households may be more valuable to nonprofit organizations; demand for their service is higher. 
Third, well-educated households may be more knowledgeable about the importance of 
volunteering work and about where their expertise can be used. 
  16 Other things being equal, Black and Hispanic households tend to spend less time on 
family care, do less volunteer work, provide less financial assistance to the family members, and 
make less charitable donations. Although contradictory to some studies regarding ethnic 
differences in the propensity to give (e.g., the Twenty-First Century Foundation, 2003), the 
finding from this study agrees with many others (e.g., Knapp & Smith, 1995) and suggests that 
the minority populations still lag systematically in the generosity to help the people both within 
and beyond their families. Consequently, educating the minority groups about philanthropy and 
volunteerism (P&V) may have a great impact on unleashing new resources in the field of P&V, 
as realized in some recent P&V programs (e.g., the W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s “Unleashing 
Resources for the Common Good Initiative”) that target those groups. 
  Income and wealth are strong predictors of financial transfers. It is not surprising that 
wealthy households tend to provide more financial assistance to their family members and make 
more charitable donations. In the meantime, when people are not actively engaged in labor 
market, they tend to do more volunteer work.  
  Family transfer decisions are probably made jointly as reflected by the symmetric nature 
of the cross-effects. To better understand family transfer behavior, therefore, researchers should 
not constrain their studies to either the within-family transfers or the beyond-family transfers. 
Instead, they should have a comprehensive model integrating the decisions about both the 
within-family and beyond-family transfers. In this way, researchers on the transfers within the 
family may benefit from and contribute to studies on philanthropy and nonprofit work. Members 
of the philanthropic community will also have a better understanding of the nature of giving and 
volunteerism, which may enhance future opportunities for such work. 
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  20Table 1. Measuring the Time and Financial Transfers Within and Beyond the Family 
Time Frames and Truncation Values Used in HRS 1992–2000 
 HRS            HRS     HRS           HRS    HRS 
           1992           1994    1996          1998    2000 
   ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (A) Time Frame     a              a                    b              b       b 
 
   (B)  Original 
      Truncation      100              50       100             100    100 
Time Transfer        Value (Hours) 
Within the Family 
     ( C )   A d j u s t e d  
       Truncation      100             100       200             200    200 
                    Value (Hours) 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      (A) Time Frame     a              a                    b              b       b 
  
   (B)  Original 
      Truncation      500             100       500             500    500 
Financial Transfer      Value (Dollars) 
Within the Family 
   (C)  Adjusted 
       Truncation     500             500     1000           1000  1000 
                    Value (Dollars) 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      (A) Time Frame     a              a                    a              a       a 
 
   (B)  Original 
      Truncation      100             100         0               0       0 
Time Transfer        Value (Hours) 
Beyond the Family 
   (C)  Adjusted 
       Truncation      100             100       100             100    100 
                    Value (Hours) 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      (A) Time Frame     a              a                    a              a       a   
 
   (B)  Original 
      Truncation      500             500       500             500    500  
Financial Transfer      Value (Dollars) 
Beyond the Family 
   (C)  Adjusted 
       Truncation      500             500       500             500    500 
                    Value (Dollars)  
 
a past 12 months. 
b Since the last interview or in the past 2 years. 
 
  21Table 2. Time and Financial Transfers Within and Beyond the Family Before and After 
Corrections: HRS 1992–2000 
 
 HRS            HRS     HRS           HRS     HRS  
           1992           1994    1996          1998    2000 
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Time Transfer Within the Family (Hours) 
 
Before Correction  Yes      .30                  .49                .45                .46                 .43 
           (A)    Mean     342            412                305              325                242 
 
After Correction    Yes      .30                  .38                .30                .34                 .31 
           (B)    Mean     342            393                291              307                226 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Financial Transfer Within the Family (Dollars) 
 
Before Correction  Yes      .40                  .47                .43                .39                 .39 
           (A)    Mean    2,231          1,906            1,614           1,557              1,541 
 
After Correction    Yes      .40                  .37               .36                .33                 .32 
           (B)    Mean    2,231          1,854             1,573           1,520             1,507 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Time Transfer Beyond the Family (Hours) 
 
Before Correction  Yes      .18                  .17                .46                .40                 .40 
           (A)    Mean       58             50                  91                 78                  88 
 
After Correction    Yes      .18                  .17                .21                .18                 .20 
           (B)    Mean       58              50                 81                 69                  78 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Financial Transfer Beyond the Family (Dollars) 
 
Before Correction  Yes      .40                  .40                .43                .44                 .45 
            (A)    Mean     823            854                991            1,066             1,289 
 
After Correction    Yes      .40                  .40                .43                .44                 .45 




Total Time Transfer  Yes      .41                  .47                .46                .45                 .44 
After Correction    Mean (Hours)    385            432                365               364                300 
           (C) 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Total Financial Transfer  Yes      .59                  .58                .59                .57                .59 
After Correction    Mean (Dollars)  3,054          2,708             2,564           2,587             2,796 
           (D) 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N          7,540          6,782             6,718            6,519            6,250 
 
Notes: (a) All results were weighted; (b) Financial transfers were in the 1996 dollars; and (c) one outlier 
(Charitable Donation=$600,000) was dropped from the HRS 2000 sample. 
  22Table 3. Definitions and Simple Statistics of the Independent Variables 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
         HRS 1992    HRS 1994    HRS 1996          HRS 1998           HRS 2000 
      -----------------     -----------------     -----------------    -----------------     ----------------- 
Variable Name    Mean    SD     Mean    SD Mean      SD  Mean    SD Mean      SD 
----------------------  -----------------     -----------------     -----------------    -----------------     ----------------- 
Age         53.9    264.9  55.7    270.5   58.3    272.1      59.9     280.6        61.8     289.1 
 
White         .84      18.0   .86       17.4          .85       18.1       .85        17.9        .85       18.1 
 
Black         .11      15.4   .10       15.3          .11       15.7       .10        15.4        .10       15.5 
 
Other Races     .05      10.5   .04   9.3    .04    9.5    .04  10.4     .04  10.6 
 
Hispanic         .07      12.2   .06       12.4          .07       13.1       .07        12.8        .07       13.1 
 
Non-Hispanic       .93      12.2   .94       12.4          .93       13.1       .93        12.8        .93       13.1 
 
Education-1       .25      21.3   .24       21.6          .25       22.1       .24        21.8        .23       21.8 
 (School Year<12) 
  
Education-2       .39      24.1   .39       24.5          .37       24.7       .37        24.6        .38       24.9 
 (School Year=12) 
  
Education-3       .20      19.7   .20       20.2          .20       20.5       .20        20.4        .21       20.8 
 (School Year=13-15) 
  
Education-4       .16      18.2   .17       18.8          .18       19.5       .18        19.6        .18       19.8 
 (School Year=16+) 
  
Couple         .68      23.0   .67       23.6          .66       24.2       .62        24.7        .62       25.0 
 (Household Has Two Respondents) 
  
With Kids     .82      19.1   .83       18.7          .82       19.5       .82        19.3         .83      19.4 
 (Whether Has Kids 18+ years old living away in 1992) 
  
HH Income ($1,000)   51.2       2.8          53.9       4.8       54.3        4.3     53.6        5.1       53.4       5.5 
 (Total Household Income in the Last Calendar Year) 
  
No Earn ($1,000)     .16      18.1           .20      20.2        .26       22.3      .31       23.5        .38       24.9 
 (No Labor Income in the Last Calendar Year) 
  
Asset ($1,000)               268.0    28.9         267.2    28.1        297.5      35.1       336.7      68.1        364.8     52.7 
 (Total Household Assets at the Time of Interview) 
 
N              7,540         6,782                  6,718                6,519                6,250 
Note: For a two respondent household, the demographic characteristics were of the respondent selected according to 
the following priority rules: (a) original HRS respondent; (b) the second respondent interviewed in a wave; and (c) 
male. Total household income was calculated as the sum of labor income, income from assets and income from 
other sources, as defined by the HRS. Labor income includes wage or salary, bonuses, tips or commissions, income 
from professional practice or trade, and income from second job or self-employment. Total household assets consist 
of housing equities, real estate, business or farm, individual retirement accounts, stocks or mutual funds, certificates 
of deposit, bonds, checking or savings accounts, transportation vehicles, and other nonliquid assets, minus debts. 
  23Table 4a. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model 
Predicting the Time Transfer Within the Family 
Independent 
Variable     HRS 1992  HRS 1994  HRS 1996  HRS 1998  HRS 2000 
-----------    ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Age          22.4**         4.2            3.6          -30.0**      -21.3** 
White         506.6*      84.3       -146.8       -130.3         -131.0 
Black          91.7      -107.0       -474.3*      -358.4        -423.3* 
Hispanic       -410.7*    -399.8**     -165.5      -392.9*        -386.1** 
Education-1       786.8**     293.1*      355.8**       90.3          287.8** 
Education-2      579.7**     349.7**      484.9**     376.1**      402.8** 
Education-3       499.0**     135.3       165.7       142.9         304.4** 
Couple         960.0**     678.5**      570.3**     562.7**      471.1** 
With Kids    1663.6**     975.2**       734.1**     742.9**      519.5**                                         
 
HH Income ($1,000)      -4.8**        -1.9**          -.7           -.3              -.6 
No Earn                      9.4          93.3            -41.5         208.9*         22.2 
Asset ($1,000)       -.007        .034        -.000       -.034          .027 
 
Money Transfer 
Within the Family    .020**         .023**       .031**        .024**       .016** 
 
Charitable Donation    -.008       -.013       -.030*       -.004             .003 
 
Volunteer Work       .494**         .543**      .503**         .226           .029 
 
Intercept      -5847.2**          -2873.2**             -2587.9**    -816.7      -796.8* 
 
Pseudo R2        .012        .007     .007       .005           .007 
 
Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year. 
* p = .05.  




  24Table 4b. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model 
Predicting the Financial Transfer Within the Family 
Independent 
Variable     HRS 1992  HRS 1994  HRS 1996  HRS 1998  HRS 2000 
-----------    ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Age        -147.4**      -160.7**    -148.1**     -115.7**     -70.8 
White        1908.7         409.8        -281.5      -339.4        -913.4 
Black      -4716.6**      -4286.1** -3589.8** -6666.1** -7296.9** 
Hispanic      -2129.7*      -521.7      -3426.5**  -4512.6**  -4155.6** 
Education-1   -8349.7**      -5226.9** -4818.6** -6611.3** -7283.3** 
Education-2   -4812.1**      -2685.0** -2811.2** -3442.2** -3567.4** 
Education-3   -2616.2**      -1124.9*   -1240.9*  *  -1985.5**  -1881.0** 
Couple          638.8       1269.6**     708.4*     -684.6          745.8 
With Kids     2252.8**          -64.5       -198.8**    -425.0     1388.3** 
                                                                 
HH Income ($1,000)        41.3**        19.7**       11.7**       25.8**       21.1** 
No Earn     -4006.5**     -2272.4**             -993.2**  -2661.0**    -539.3 
Asset ($1,000)             2.0**          1.9**         1.3**           .4**           .8** 
 
Time Transfer                                                                 
Within the Family         1.2**           .8**         1.0**         1.0**        1.2** 
 
Charitable Donation           .16*           .44**         .25**         .21**        .12** 
 
Volunteer Work             3.1**           .6                .4           1.0              .3 
 
Intercept                    -958.7       3199.6          -6000.0**   3728.5     -778.2 
 
Pseudo R2         .018          .021           .020         .022          .019 
 
Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year. 
* p = .05. 
** p = .01. 
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Table 4c. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model 
Predicting the Time Transfer Beyond the Family 
Independent 
Variable     HRS 1992  HRS 1994  HRS 1996  HRS 1998  HRS 2000 
-----------    ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Age                 -.3            -.5             2.8           8.0*         4.9 
White            200.0*        -19.7         -34.2        -14.8            31.9 
Black             -57.5        -211.9*      -119.6      -266.8*    -239.8* 
Hispanic          -218.1**     -162.4*      -208.1**    -251.7**   -279.1** 
Education-1        -552.6**     -496.7**   -599.8**    -598.2**   -856.9** 
Education-2        -289.7**     -271.3**   -366.5**      -300.0**   -428.0** 
Education-3        -221.3**     -131.7**   -215.2**    -220.2**   -261.1** 
Couple            139.1**      151.6**    296.7**     267.4**    373.0** 
With Kids           67.6            1.0            10.3         14.3          101.3 
                                 
HH Income ($1,000)             -.8**           -.5*              -.1         -.05               -.2 
No Earn            13.6         19.3               52.6                     39.3         125.0** 
Asset ($1,000)             .01           .01            .02         -.01               .01 
 
Time Transfer 
Within the Family            .03*         .04**        .08**        .03*               .03 
 
Money Transfer 
Within the Family          .010**       .004*           .001        .002          -.001 
 
Charitable Donation           .06**        .05**       .022**        .040**      .011** 
 
Intercept         -923.9**   -676.8**         -761.6**    1269.0**  -1261.9** 
 
Pseudo R2            .023        .026          .020        .024           .022    
 
Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year. 
* p = .05. 
** p = .01. 
  26Table 4d. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model 
Predicting the Financial Transfer Beyond the Family 
Independent 
Variable     HRS 1992  HRS 1994  HRS 1996  HRS 1998  HRS 2000 
-----------    ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Age             41.1**          33.9* *       52.2*        45.9**        111.9** 
White           634.5*      1093.2**   1360.8*    1054.1*    2020.3 
Black         -121.4             45.0       519.2      -455.4        -567.8 
Hispanic    -2178.3**        -2284.7**  -3519.0**  -3193.4**  -5511.8** 
Education-1    -2758.8**     -3440.4**  -4905.4**  -4949.2**  -8040.4** 
Education-2    -1437.8**     -1972.0**  -2243.3**  -2762.3**  -4181.6** 
Education-3       -857.0**     -1223.2**  -1563.7**  -1611.2**  -2653.9** 
Couple        1394.2**      1851.8**   2613.1**   2147.6**   4437.6** 
With Kids           2.9          166.6      303.0       239.3       -885.5** 
                                 
HH Income ($1,000)        14.4**           2.9**         1.3             4.5**       15.1** 
No Earn          -989.1**    -1235.9**            -1927.4**  -1338.7**    -1537.9** 
Asset ($1,000)                .9**             .9**          2.0**           .4**         1.1** 
 
Time Transfer 
Within the Family       .005           -.024        -.338*         -.047             .089 
 
Money Transfer 
Within the Family       .010            .060**     .200**          .045**       .223** 
 
Volunteer Work           1.79**         3.47**     3.55**          2.99**       4.18** 
 
Intercept      -4919.1**    -4683.5**         -8380.2** -  -5497.8**  14632.9** 
 
Pseudo R2           .036             .032          .031         .026          .022  
 
Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year. 
* p = .05. 
** p = .01.
  27Table 5. Cross-Effects of the Time and Financial Transfers 
Shown in the Single Wave Models 
 
                                                      Model 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 Time              Money 
      ------------------------------------------------           --------------------------------------------------- 
      Within the Family    Beyond the Family    Within the Family        Beyond the Family 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Within  the 
  Family           x        +*          +**             0 
Time  
 Beyond  the 
  Family          +*        x          0             +** 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Within  the 
  Family          +**        0          x             +** 
Money  
 Beyond  the 
  Family           0        +**          +**             x 
 Family 
 
Note: + = positive cross-effect; 0 = no cross-effect; x = not relevant for the cross-effect.   
*p = .05. 
**p = .01. 
  28Table 6. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Models 
Predicting the Time and Financial Transfers with Pooled Data 
       M o d e l  
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
            Time Transfer      Financial Transfer  Time Transfer      Financial Transfer 
    Independent           Within the      Within the      Beyond the      Beyond the 
    Variable           Family         Family    Family        Family   
    --------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------       
    Age                         -8.8**               -149.6**              7.4**                 92.6** 
    White                       40.3                   260.1              38.2        1267.0** 
    Black                  -258.1**              -5393.6**        -174.0**             -323.8 
    Hispanic              -347.0**             -3095.7**       -231.3**          -3832.6** 
    Education-1             394.8**             -6736.7**       -649.7**          -5507.2** 
    Education-2             454.6**            -3670.2**        -355.9**          -2927.6** 
    Education-3             248.5**             -1877.1**        -223.2**          -1805.8** 
    Couple                  623.0**                 683.8**         265.8**            2894.6** 
    With Kids                   914.5**                 606.9**              38.1               -107.4** 
 
    HH Income ($1,000)         -.95**                  24.0**             -.09                    7.6** 
    No Earn                  44.2              -1853.9**           59.3**             -1545.5** 
    Asset ($1,000)        .003                      .814**            .011                    .853** 
 
    Time Transfer 
    Within the Family        --                       1.0**           .04**           -.090 
     
    Money Transfer 
    Within the Family       .02**                 --         .004**             .087** 
     
    Volunteer Work       .30**                    1.23**       --             3.38** 
     
    Charitable Donation    -.003                       .18**            .02**           -- 
      
    Intercept                       -2392.2**          3451.7**               -1226.2**        -10009.78**  
 
    Pseudo R2               .007                    .019        .021                    .025 
 
Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year. 
* p = .05. 
** p = .01. 
     
     
  29Table 7. Cross-Effects of the Time and Financial Transfers 
Shown in the Pooled Data Models 
 
                                                      Model 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 Time              Money 
      ------------------------------------------------           --------------------------------------------------- 
      Within the Family    Beyond the Family    Within the Family        Beyond the Family 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Within  the 
  Family           x        +**          +**             0 
Time  
 Beyond  the 
  Family          +**        x          +**             +** 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Within  the 
  Family          +**        +**          x             +** 
Money  
 Beyond  the 
  Family           0        +**          +**             x 
 Family 
 
Note: + = positive cross effect; 0 = no cross effect; x = not relevant for the cross effect. 
* p = .05. 
** p = .01. 
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